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Antitrust and American Business Abroad. By James R. Atwood and Kingman Brewster. Colorado Springs. Shephard's/McGraw Hill, 2nd ed. 1981,
vol. 1, pp. xxxix, 359, Vol. 2, pp. xxi, 411.$120.

The senior author's first edition of this book in 19581 was the first treatise to address this octopus-like theme. At the time the subject may have
seemed arcane, but the extraterritorial reach of the United States antitrust
laws had already raised troublesome legal issues and created adverse political reactions overseas. International antitrust law is a subject which has
since attracted other scholars," and it certainly is no longer arcane; the international implications of our antitrust laws are now routinely addressed
when commercial lawyers gather,8 and a working knowledge of the subject
belongs to the intellectual equipment of every practicing lawyer who advises
clients on international transactions.
The occasion for a comprehensive and updated treatment of the subject could hardly be more timely. What is perceived abroad as an imperialistic expansion of the United States jurisdiction in the antitrust area, both
prbcedural and substantive, has now spawned reactions which have come
home with a vengeance. No longer are foreign governments content with
diplomatic protests or other ad hoc reactions to specific instances of perceived overreaching by American courts or enforcement agencies; many foreign states have enacted systematic and broadly based defensive measures."
Further, antitrust law is no longer a peculiarly American institution. The
free market principles underlying our antitrust laws have been endorsed by
the United Nations themselves, 5 even though the effect of such endorsement, being hortatory in nature, may as yet be largely symbolic. More importantly, several countries, acting alone or in concert, most notably the
European Economic Community, have enacted antitrust regimes which are
no less keen than our own in seeking to assure the operation of the free
market and which are no less vigorously enforced, even though the enforce-
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ment mechanism and philosophy of such foreign antitrust regimes may differ vastly from our own. Finally, in 1958 the American economy was preeminent in the world, while today it is comparatively of a lesser stature.
This fact alone has curtailed the ability of the United States to project its
"home grown competitive ethic" into the international environment; when
viewed in conjunction with the changed international legal environment, it
gives ample reason for a sober reassessment of the extraterritorial application of American antitrust law and its supporting procedural rules.
Atwood's revision of Brewster's pioneering work6 is, therefore, a welcome guide to the "Great Grimpen Mire" that is international antitrust.
One could not wish for more competent pilots. After he wrote the first edition, Brewster went on to become the President of Yale University and our
ambassador to the court of St. James. Atwood was associated with the Department of State while his work on this revision was in progress. From
their varied experiences, the authors bring to bear on the subject the combined insights, of the scholar, the diplomat, and the private counselor in a
thoughtfully balanced manner.
Not surprisingly, then, the authors' approach is practical in the best
sense of the term. The book begins with an outline of the global context in
which the legal rules of our antitrust laws operate when applied beyond our
shores, including economic constraints such as the raw materials deficit and
the intertwined political tensions stemming from the traditional East-West
confrontation and the often acrimonious North-South dialogue. The same
approach is used in the presentation of each topic. For instance, the chapters on particular business ventures, such as exporting, licensing and the
like, begin with an outline of what a business firm may wish to do within
the concrete international setting in which it finds itself, and then move on
to discuss how antitrust rules steer, channel, promote or frustrate such undertakings. At a time when much academic writing on antitrust law makes
the law appear to be a mere appendage of micro-economic theories, this
book is a healthy reminder that the antitrust laws, at least in the international arena, are embedded in a rich and complex setting which does not
permit any single mode of analysis.
In a traditional subject-matter sense, the substantive core of the book
is a brief number of chapters dealing with specific types of business transactions and their international antitrust implications. Chapters 9 and 10 dis-
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cuss export and import arrangements; chapter 11 treats the licensing of patents, trademarks, and unpatented information; and chapter 12 deals with
investments, joint ventures and similar arrangements involving United
States and foreign enterprises. This discussion is preceded by a presentation
of the doctrinal, historical, and policy concerns of the extra-territorial reach
of our antitrust laws. Chapters 2, 5, and 6 present a lucid presentation of
the jurisdictional and substantial developments of this aspect of the law
from its timid origin in American Bananas via the landmark Alcoa case0 to
the present attempts at refinement in cases such as Timberland'0 and Mannington Mills." Already intricate, this canvas is enriched, in chapter 3, by
a guided tour through the United States foreign trade laws, whose origin
and purpose is unconnected to the concerns of antitrust but whose operations in the real world impinge upon it: subjects such as GATT, the statutory regulation of imports, and regulated industries such as ocean shipping,
aviation, insurance, and agriculture. This area is complex in itself. The bewildered novice leaves it somewhat comforted by the authors' valiant attempt to provide a lucid exposition of an opaque subject. When thus viewed
as a whole, our law pertaining to irternational commerce is not only
fraught internally with conflicts of policy and uncertainty of doctrine, it is
confronted with competing legal regimes as it travels beyond the water's
edge.
In chapter 4, the authors discuss the reaction of foreign governments to
the extraterritorial applications of our antitrust laws that are perceived
abroad as improper incursions into legitimate preserves of foreign states or
the rights of their nationals. The most extreme of these foreign reactions
was pioneered by the United Kingdom. Among other provisions, the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 198012 introduced a concept which was new
to English law and, at the time, to other legal systems as well: A defendant
meeting certain qualifications who has suffered a treble damage judgment
in the United States now has a cause of action in the British courts to
recover from the successful plaintiff the excess of the American judgment
over the actual damages which the foreign plaintiff has incurred. A similar
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statute has since been enacted in Australia' s and one is under consideration
in Canada."' Less assertive protective statutes, ones preventing the enforcement of United States judgments under certain circumstances, have been
enacted by a number of countries, and an even larger number of countries
have passed legislation designed to inhibit the exercise of discovery orders
by American courts. Characteristically, such legislation provides for the involvement of the executive in its implementation, thus permitting perhaps a
more predictable balancing of the conflicting policy interests than decentralized balancing attempts by individual courts. The breadth and frequency of these foreign responses belies the assertion by some commentators'" that the motivations of foreign countries are merely cynical attempts
to protect their own nationals against their just desserts. This is further
reflected in the existence and vigor of foreign antitrust laws. Chapter 13
provides an overview of such foreign antitrust regimes, principally in the
European Economic Community. In this comparative chapter, the authors
emphasize that the doctrinal underpinnings for the extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws are by no means unique or exotic.
Thus, the basic principle underlying the "effects" test as established in Alcoa is shared by the Commission of the European Economic Community
and by the antitrust statutes of Germany, Australia, and other countries."
On the other hand, our reliance on private antitrust suits, reflecting, as it
does, our faith in the efficacy of private litigation as a tool to accomplish
public objectives, is uniquely American and is not shared abroad. As a British law reform commission has put it: "A society in which all human and
social problems were regarded as apt for a legal remedy or susceptible to
legal procedures would not be one in which we would find it agreeable to
live."" 7 Particularly instructive in this connection is a comparison between
the familiar mechanism of pre-trial discovery as a mainstay in the American enforcement system (chapter 15) and the reliance on regulatory controls elsewhere.
In the final part of the book the authors offer an evaluation of the
impact of the application of the U.S. antitrust laws to business activities
abroad and offer recommendations how better to attune our antitrust laws
and their administration to the realities of the international environment.
Both their evaluation and their recommendations are offered with characteristic modesty and circumspection. The authors conclude that "it is diffi-
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cult to build a convincing case that antitrust as presently applied has had a
major negative effect on American business abroad."" They concede some
adverse effects, but they believe that these are counterbalanced by the
opening of markets which otherwise might have remained closed by private
agreement.1
In addressing the question of what adjustments should be made, the
authors remind the reader that the U.S. antitrust laws must serve a variety
of needs and accommodate a variety of policies. Nonetheless, they do not
hesitate to present formal recommendations addressed to Congress, the enforcement agencies and the courts. Perhaps the most ambitious legislative
proposal is for congressional action to create a presumption against the
availability of the treble damage remedy 20in certain situations involving only
indirect contacts with the United States.
A reviewer cannot blame the authors for having written the book they
wrote rather than the book the reviewer might wish that someone would
write: "U.S. antitrust as seen through foreign eyes". 1 Perhaps only such a
book could fully elucidate the intensity of foreign concerns (of which counsel engaged in advising foreign clients are well aware 2 ), and help distinguish areas of international consensus from those where the intellectual and
institutional solutions adopted in this country are parochial and, when seen
from abroad, inept. Such a treatment might serve as a useful antidote to
the ethnocentric perspective that underlies not only much of our traditional
enforcement philosophy but also, ironically, some scholarly writing in the
international field.22 It is out of an awareness of such foreign concerns that
these reviewers wish the authors had included among their recommendations restraints on the extraterritorial scope and reach of American discovery procedures. To be sure, discovery is not a tool that is unique to the
antitrust laws. But it was in the context of antitrust enforcement, in particular through private plaintiffs, that foreign persons and governments
learned perhaps their most unhappy lessons on this procedural aspect of
American law.
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The first edition of this book was not only a pioneer among scholarly
studies, it helped make a contribution to the development of the law. Its call
for a retreat from the "effects" test of Alcoa in favor of a balanced approach to the jurisdictional determination2 4 has commended itself to the
Timberlane court25 and other American courts 20 , and it should find the approval of foreign commentators otherwise critical of the perceived tendency
of our laws to overreach.2 7 This second edition may prove equally influential. It is certain to be seriously studied by practicing counsel, enforcement
officials, and judges as well as (one may hope) by legislators.
But a word of caution seems in order. While the concept of a balanced
approach has appealed to most observers, it is not certain whether it provides the answer to the conflicts created by extraterritorial assertions of
American antitrust jurisdiction. Some objections, such as the complexity of
balancing tests or the risk of denial of the protection of the laws to an
injured plaintiff for policy reasons,28 may not withstand scrutiny. Our
courts are routinely entrusted, and are quite able to cope, with complex
issues calling for the evaluation and balancing of complex factors; and jurisdictional determinations involving issues of comity do not constitute
choices between "law" and "policy" (with the possibility that "law" might
lose out) but rather constitute, in their entirety, legal determinations not
unlike conflicts of laws questions generally.2 9 It may, however, be legitimately asked "whether it is effectively more insulting to the sovereignty of
a foreign country for its interests to be ignored under an 'effects' test or to
be directly considered and found inconsequential under a 'balancing approach' ".30 As suggested above, foreign objections to our legal practices
have not been so much directed at the "effects" doctrine as such but to
typically American procedural and enforcement mechanisms, principally
our heavy reliance on private suits buttressed by the contingent fee system,
absence of cost recovery by a successful defendant, discovery, and the multiple damage remedy.3 1 Foreign legislative reactions have, accordingly, been
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principally directed against these elements. It is doubtful whether our procedural techniques will be modified in deference to foreign concerns, although, if the authors have their way, the treble damage remedy would be
so modified. As to subject-matter jurisdiction, these reviewers are not convinced that our courts have yet declined jurisdiction under a "balancing"
test where they would have asserted it under an "effects" test." Thus, the
jury is still out on the issue of "our law against theirs." Whatever the verdict, the authors have doubtlessly done their part to respond to the invitation expressed in the House of Commons when the Protection of Trading
Interest Act was debated:
The late Sir Winston Churchill said that jaw-jaw was better than warwar. For years we tried jaw-jaw.We have now been driven to law-law.
That is the situation in which we have landed. We hope that the American authorities will notice our reluctance and draw the conclusion that
is for them now, inthe fullness of time, after the Bill is enacted, to
s8
come forward with their ideas on how we should proceed beyond that.
Ernest C. Stiefel*
Peter Fuerle**
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